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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the 
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy.  Housed at Georgetown University Law 
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative 
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic 
diseases to health care financing and health systems.  The Institute, a joint project of the Law 
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable 
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics. 
 
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has 
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global, 
national, and local communities.  By contributing to a more powerful and deeper 
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill 
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decision-
makers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for 
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives. 
 
 Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon 
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys, 
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many 
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor.  The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare 
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care 
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural, 
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems. 
 
 Scholarship.  O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems, 
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond 
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a 
scientific endeavor.   
 
 Reflective Problem-Solving.  For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes 
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between 
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent 
and knowledge that resides in academia. 
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OVERVIEW 
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 
 
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern.  In order 
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President 
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health 
reform.  In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, 
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised.  Due to the diverse interests involved, these 
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates.  Therefore, it is critical that 
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that 
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform.  In an effort to 
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the 
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.  
 
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may 
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate.  While other academic and research 
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health 
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health 
reform.  The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key 
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other 
key players.  This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation 
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health 
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES  
 
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policy-
based and those that are legally-based.  Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and 
cannot be considered in isolation.  However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the 
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or 
prohibition.   
 
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of 
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for 
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services.  In contrast, legal issues are 
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution 
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict. 
 
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as 
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning 
with, “Can we…?”  The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular 
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and 
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?”  This 
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.   
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PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT 
 
This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat 
of political debate.  This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems 
addressed are either soluble or avoidable.  Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a 
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.  
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is 
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.  
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or 
make recommendations among them.  Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide 
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal 
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for 
resolving those questions.   
 
LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press, 
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal 
health reform.  After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of 
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten.  An initial framing paper was drafted which identified 
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each.  In May of 2008, a 
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and 
framing of the legal issues.  The attendees of the consultation session included congressional 
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide 
range of interests affected by health reform.  Feedback and analysis from this session further 
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current 
law.   
 
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant 
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made.  There are 
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is 
adopted, the system changes.  In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for 
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.    
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
Proposals to allow the purchase of insurance across state lines (PASL) have gained some 
support in recent years.  Health insurers have traditionally been allowed to sell a policy 
only within the state that approved and regulates that particular policy.  PASL would 
allow insurers to sell a policy approved in one state to people residing in any state.  
 
Any federal legislation to enact PASL in an individual insurance market would have to 
address two main legal considerations: 1) the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which allows the 
states to retain their regulatory authority over insurance, and 2) a constitutional 
prohibition against the commandeering of state officials by the federal government.  This 
paper outlines these obstacles and potential solutions, and concludes that as long as the 
legislation is thoughtfully drafted (see below), there is no significant legal or 
Constitutional barrier to enacting PASL.  Additionally, the concepts discussed here may 
be relevant to any federal health reform legislation involving regulation of health 
insurance or the use of state officials.      
 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: 
 Congressional Authority under the McCarran-Ferguson Act:  The federal 
McCarran-Ferguson Act delineates the respective roles of the federal and state 
governments in regulating health insurance.  While states retain the primary role in 
regulating health insurance, the federal government can preempt state laws in this 
area if it does so explicitly and clearly, or if a federal law specifically relates to the 
business of insurance.  PASL legislation is most likely to  survive a potential court 
challenge to Congress’ authority if it includes both of the following two steps: 
 
 Clearly state that Congress is using its Commerce Clause power: Courts have 
historically been very deferential to Congress when it is legislating under its 
Commerce Clause authority, increasing the chance that the legislation would be 
upheld.  A clear statement of Commerce Clause jurisdiction in legislation would 
make this authority clear to the Court. 
 
 Ensure that the legislation meets the legal preemption standard: The 
legislation could expressly state that the law preempts state laws on the subject.  
Alternatively, Congress could include clear language ensuring that the legislation 
specifically relates to the business of insurance, which would meet the Supreme 
Court test for preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  
 
 Commandeering of State Officials: The federal government is prohibited under the 
Constitution from requiring state officials to implement or enforce federal law, or 
“commandeering” those state officials.  However, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
the federal government can regulate interstate commerce, so long as state officials are 
not required to alter their actions as a result.  Congress can also attach conditions or 
requirements to federal money it grants to the states.   
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For a PASL proposal, concerns about commandeering challenges can be minimized by 
Congress’ taking the following steps:  
 
 Impose No New Duties: Congress should make the strongest case possible that 
any responsibilities modified by the PASL legislation do not impose new duties 
on state officials. Additionally, Congress could characterize the participation of 
states as “primary states” in PASL as voluntary.  
 
 Use Congress’s Spending Power: If Congress provides new funding to states to 
incentivize them to participate in a PASL program, it can rely on its 
Constitutional spending power and can attach requirements on the states’ 
participation.  Use of the relatively broad spending power can minimize any 
commandeering concerns. 
 
LEGAL ISSUES & APPLICABLE LAW: 
 McCarran-Ferguson Act: Ordinarily, where a state and federal law conflict, the 
federal law preempts (takes priority over) the state law.  The federal McCarran-
Ferguson Act, by contrast, re-affirms the role of the states as the primary regulators of 
the insurance industry while preserving federal authority to regulate insurance if it 
acts specifically to do so.  If Congress wishes to preempt state health insurance law, it 
can explicitly declare that a particular piece of legislation preempts state law, or draft 
the legislation to fit under the exception provided by the Act for legislation 
specifically relating to the business of insurance. 
 
 Commandeering of State Officials: The Tenth Amendment and the principle of 
state sovereignty in the Constitution prohibit the federal government from 
commanding the states to implement federal law or policies that would interfere with 
state sovereignty.  This is referred to as the “anti-commandeering” principle.  A 
PASL bill could minimize this constitutional concern by characterizing duties of state 
officials as consistent with existing duties and by providing incentives to states 
through funding, as opposed to requiring state participation. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
PASL legislation can be implemented, if it addresses key legal issues using the solutions 
outlined above.  McCarran-Ferguson concerns can be addressed by carefully crafting the 
legislation with explicit references to the insurance industry, or by including a specific 
statement of preemption.  Concerns about the commandeering of state officials can be 
curtailed by drafting the legislation so that state officials are not given additional duties, 
and by providing financial incentives to the states to enforce the federal law.  
Policymakers should keep in mind that the solutions above, in addition to being relevant 
to PASL proposals, may also be relevant to any federal legislation involving the federal 
regulation of health insurance or that requires specific action by state officials. 
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform: 
The Purchase of Insurance Across State Lines in the Individual Market 
Stephanie Kanwit1 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the legal issues associated with the leading and much-debated proposals that 
aim to revitalize state regulatory competition and allow individuals to purchase insurance across 
state lines (PASL).  These proposals seek to reverse decades-old principles of state preeminence 
in the regulation of individual health insurance and instead create “jurisdictional competition” in 
the individual market by allowing an insurer to choose the state under whose law it wishes to be 
regulated, subject to certain consumer protections.  Advocates say this type of jurisdictional 
competition would reform perceived problems in the individual market and lower the costs of 
individual health insurance by imposing the regulatory authority of only the insurer’s selected 
“home” state.  
 
Supporters of PASL legislation cite the perceived advantages of greater competition, a reduction 
in the costs of regulation, and additional consumer choice.  For example, the health care reform 
program of the former Republican presidential nominee, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) featured a 
PASL proposal along with modifications to the tax treatment of employer sponsored coverage, 
tax credits, and funding of guaranteed access plans.2  In fact, legislation authorizing PASL was 
introduced in both the 109th and 110th Congresses by Representative Shadegg (R-AZ)3, allowing 
insurers to select a “primary” state to govern the policy, but also giving a “secondary” state 
authority to enforce certain consumer protections as well as collect premium taxes.4 
 
In accordance with the ground rules for the Legal Solutions in Health Reform project, this paper 
does not take a position on the merits of PASL as a component of health care reform.  As we 
discovered over the course of the Presidential campaign season, the various supporters and 
opponents of PASL have articulated these views in some detail, and we anticipate further 
discussion of this approach.5  Instead, this paper explores the legal as well as practical legislative 
issues associated with potential federal legislation to allow PASL.  Note that for space 
limitations, this paper focuses on the individual market for health insurance as opposed to 
insured group markets, although many of the same fundamental legal issues would apply.   
 
Part I summarizes the issues that PASL legislation seeks to address and discusses the current 
regulatory framework of health insurance to provide background as to how PASL could alter the 
regulatory environment.  Part II outlines these leading federal proposals, as well as touches 
briefly on analogous state efforts.  Whether these proposals can be implemented is addressed in 
the second half of the paper, with Part III discussing two basic legal issues that may arise from 
PASL proposals: how to draft any legislative language to both (1) avoid running afoul of the 
federal McCarran-Ferguson Act6, and (2) avoid improperly requiring state insurance departments 
to enforce new federal standards and thus possibly violating the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, as well as solutions for minimizing these possible legal problems.   
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I. Current Regulatory Environment 
 
Today, more than 230 million Americans access health care coverage through their employers or 
through government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.  Most non-elderly individuals 
receive private health coverage through health and welfare benefit plans sponsored by 
employers; in 2006, about 158 million non-elderly people were insured through employer-
sponsored insurance.  A significant number, however, purchase insurance on their own in the 
individual market: one estimate puts the number at over 17 million in 2007.7  The number of 
individuals who are currently uninsured is estimated at over 45 million.8  The true intended 
audience of a PASL proposal will likely vary, however, depending on how and whether the 
proposal is linked with the offer of incentives or disincentives for employer-based coverage.  For 
example, some proposals – such as those offered by Senator McCain eliminating the favorable 
tax treatment of health insurance benefits provided to workers when coupled with a PASL 
proposal – could have the effect of increasing coverage in the individual market but only at the 
expense of diminishing employer-based coverage.9 
 
Proposals to allow PASL are based on the assumption that state mandated benefits, state rating 
rules, and state regulatory regimes distort pricing and result in decreased uptake of insurance by 
price-sensitive consumers in the individual market.  Under current law, companies may only sell 
policies to individuals who reside or work in the state in which the company is licensed 
(although large insurers license products in every state).  So, for example, a New Jersey resident 
has no choice but to purchase a policy from a carrier licensed in that state and that carrier can 
only sell that resident a policy compliant with all the state’s mandates as well as its guaranteed 
issue and community rating requirements.  But because of the variation in state requirements 
regarding guaranteed issue, mandates, and rating rules, as well as state demographics, there is a 
tremendously wide price variation in individual policies.  According to a recent nationwide 
survey, annual premiums averaged $5,326 for single coverage in New Jersey in the 2006-2007 
period, but only $1,254 in Wisconsin.10  Contrast the cost of a New Jersey individual policy – 
$5,326 – with that of a Connecticut policy, where the average cost would be much lower, $3,326.  
The national average cost of such a policy was $2,613.11    
 
A particular New Jersey consumer, however, looking to purchase insurance in the individual 
market might feel that the state’s extensive regulation was “worth it,” especially if he or she has 
medical issues, since no one can be turned down for coverage in the individual market, and the 
particular mandates for certain “high-cost” benefits will cause the cost to be spread out across a 
large community-rated pool. In contrast, the relatively younger New Jersey resident without 
health conditions might prefer a cheaper product rated for his or her individual risk as it would 
be in other states.  Supporters of PASL proposals argue a solution to this problem is to create a 
national market for individual health insurance to allow for greater competition by insurers, a 
greater choice in the types of plans available to individuals, and consequentially lower prices as a 
result of decreased mandates, less-expensive rating rules, and a more favorable regulatory 
environment.12  Supporters point to historical analogies such as Delaware corporate chartering, 
dual banking charters, regional compacts for banking, the Risk Retention Act, regulation of 
surplus lines insurance, and association health plans.13 
 
Consumer advocates, on the other hand, are concerned lest PASL proposals have the effect of 
circumventing state consumer protections by producing a regulatory “race to the bottom,” with 
insurers selecting the least regulated state with the fewest mandates as their primary state.  
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Opponents further note the adverse consumer impact, in that insurers remaining in states with 
more mandates will necessarily be forced to increase costs as a result of individuals requiring 
those mandated benefits remaining in the secondary state’s pool.   
 
The dissenting Democrats summarized their concerns with the Choice Act at the hearing before 
the House Subcommittee on Health in 2005 – namely, that the legislation would erode consumer 
protections, since “[s]tates would be powerless to stop out-of-State insurance companies from 
selling coverage in their State which did not meet important State consumer and benefit 
protections.”14  The protections cited included access to emergency care and specialty care, 
mandated benefits such as maternity coverage, and enforcement of state fraud and abuse laws.  
Others have reiterated that restrictions on state authority would probably create a greater risk of 
fraud and abuse, requiring a state (for example) to turn to the courts to shut down an insurance 
company regulated by another “primary” state rather than use the current more expedited 
administrative process.15  There is also the problem created by a primary state’s regulators’ 
having to provide assistance to consumers living in a (much-smaller) secondary state, such as the 
difficulties that might await a California consumer who buys a policy from a company licensed 
in Delaware and is then forced to seek protection from “a regulator some 3,000 miles away and 
staffed to regulate insurance markets on a much smaller population scale.”16 
   
The witnesses testifying in favor of the Choice Act, conversely, emphasized that the bill was 
indeed “pro-consumer” in that it provided an option for those who cannot “afford all the 
services and ‘protections’ prescribed by their state,” in the form of mandates and community 
rating, for example.17  These pro-PASL witnesses assured the Committee that the bill contained 
adequate consumer protections, including requirements regarding disclosure, requirements 
relating to the insurer’s financial stability, and the availability of an independent review 
mechanism.18  The testimony also noted the current reality of a mobile and decentralized 
workforce, made possible by the Internet and other communication tools, rendering state-based 
insurance regulation an anachronism in some cases.19 
 
Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office has weighed in since the Choice Act hearing in 
the House with a cautionary note: that the very virtue of any PASL proposal – its goal of 
increasing access to the individual market – may turn out to be its Achilles heel if it is not 
carefully designed.  The increase in individual market uptake may reduce the number of people 
who are covered by employer-sponsored coverage, the CBO notes in its assessment of the 
Choice Act, since: (1) some employers (especially smaller employers) would stop offering 
coverage because individual market coverage would become less expensive; and (2) some 
employees with low health care costs might opt to purchase this less expensive coverage in the 
individual market.  Thus, the resulting increase in the per-person cost of the remaining 
employees in the group might cause employers to drop coverage.20  
 
In order to understand the state “patchwork” of insurance law that PASL supporters are seeking 
to address, it is necessary to understand the historical framework of insurance regulation. 
 
A.  State Insurance Regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
 
States have historically had the primary role in regulation of insurance products.  This role was 
reaffirmed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 (McCarran-Ferguson Act),21  enacted in 
response to  the Supreme Court decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 
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holding  that insurance activity which crossed state lines was interstate commerce and  subject to 
the federal antitrust laws.22  Faced with the prospect of federal antitrust penalties for 
commonplace and arguably pro-competitive insurer activities, the insurance industry joined with 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to obtain passage of McCarran-
Ferguson.  
 
The Act had two aims: (1) to re-affirm the role of the states as the primary regulators of the 
insurance industry while preserving federal authority to regulate insurance through “specific” 
enactments; and (2) to provide limited federal antitrust immunity for the insurance industry.23  
The relevant statutory language is as follows: 
 
(a) State regulation  
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to 
the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such 
business.  
 
(b) Federal regulation  
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or 
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically 
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, that . . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the 
Clayton Act, and the . . . Federal Trade Commission Act, shall be applicable to 
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State 
Law.24 
 
While the Act specifies that “silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose 
any barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the business of insurance] by the several states,” 
explicit wording in a federal statute could still allow federal law to trump a state’s authority to 
act.25 
 
In response to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, states have developed comprehensive regulation of 
the “business of insurance,” including licensing, market conduct, financial solvency, policy 
language, underwriting standards, agent licensing, receivership, and (in some cases) pricing of 
coverage.  States have also used the limited antitrust immunity under the Act to develop various 
forms of rate regulation, often in the form of model laws developed by the NAIC.  To protect 
consumers, all states have also adopted unfair trade practices laws to regulate not only insurer 
but also producer marketing and advertising activities. 
 
B.  State Regulation: Rating, Mandated Benefits, Regulatory Regimes 
 
The states’ authority to regulate health plans and health insurers is limited by federal law under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974  (ERISA),26 which specifically preempts 
any state regulation of employer self-funded group products and provides for uniformity in 
certain areas for group plans insured through state-regulated insurers.  ERISA does, however, 
allow the states to regulate the “business of insurance” and hence health insurance policies 
purchased by employers.27  In addition to ERISA, the states’ authority is also limited by other 
federal reforms – most notably, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) – which created certain minimum insurance protections for both federally-regulated 
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and traditionally state-regulated coverage.28  Two of its provisions are especially relevant: (1) 
guaranteed renewal, requiring that all health coverage (individual and group) be renewable upon 
expiration of the policy term;29 and (2) group-to-individual portability, guaranteeing eligible 
individuals losing group coverage access to coverage through individually-purchased insurance 
or alternatives, such as state-sponsored high-risk pools.30 
 
But at the same time it imposed a “floor” of federal protections in certain areas on states, HIPAA 
also gave the states substantial flexibility in determining the mechanism for making coverage 
available to those eligible and for enforcing the insurance-related portions of that federal statute 
for both the group and individual markets.  Thus, states could opt to apply the “federal fallback” 
approach or develop an alternative mechanism that: (1) offers a choice of guaranteed access 
coverage to all eligible individuals; (2) imposes no preexisting condition exclusions; and (3) 
adopts one of several approaches relating to risk spreading, including a standard high-risk pool 
approach (which includes a 200% premium cap) and any other approach that provides for risk 
adjustment, risk spreading, or a financial subsidy to eligible individuals.31   In most states, 
eligible individuals are guaranteed access to coverage in the state’s high-risk pool. 
  
That substantial flexibility left to the states by HIPAA – consistent with the primacy of state 
regulation of insurance – has left, and in some areas even increased, considerable state-by-state 
variation in, for example, how those risk pools work and  how effective guaranteed renewability 
is when coverage may be unaffordable.  The key driver to PASL proposals is to minimize that 
widely varying state regulation in the individual market, on the assumption that the divergence of 
state regulatory regimes imposes considerable additional costs for those purchasing in the 
individual market.  State regulation often involves more than one entity in the same state, as well 
as laws and regulations that are at significant variance with each other.  Supporters of state 
regulation, however, argue that such costs for state oversight – including market conduct 
examinations, corrective actions for insurers, and establishing state guaranty funds in case of 
insurer insolvency – are valuable, since they assure that individuals are best protected by local 
regulators and responsive elected officials.  
 
Under the various PASL proposals, health insurance issuers could offer individual policies of 
insurance from any state regardless of the residence state of the individual purchaser, subject to 
the primary state’s mandated benefit laws, rating laws (including community rating, for 
example), guaranteed issue, and guaranteed renewal laws.  The mandated benefits requirements 
and rules affecting the extent to which insurers may charge different prices for coverage offered 
to individuals are anticipated to have the greatest effect on the price of individual health 
coverage – assuming that the cost of care is constant across all geographic areas. 
 
The following is a short description of three key areas of state regulatory variation identified by 
supporters of PASL proposals: 1) Community rating and guaranteed issue; 2) Mandated benefits; 
and 3) General regulatory regimes. 
 
1. Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue 
 
A minority of states have attempted to make health coverage more accessible in the individual 
market by enacting “guaranteed issue” and “community rating” reforms, which forbid age-based 
premiums differentials and medical underwriting for new policies.  Under community rating, 
insurers generally are not allowed to vary rates based on the health or claims of a business or 
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person, although adjusted or modified community rating can permit adjustments for such factors 
as geographic location and age.32 “Guaranteed issue” requirements prohibit insurers from 
denying coverage to individuals based on health status, and currently five states require all 
insurers to sell coverage to all applicants in the individual market on a guaranteed issue basis.33  
As a result of the passage of HIPAA in 1996, all insurers are required to sell their small group 
policies on a guaranteed issue basis, but in the individual market, when not linked with an 
individual mandate, such laws may encourage healthy individuals to remain uninsured until 
health care coverage is needed.  
 
These reforms tend to create subsidies for older and/or less healthy individuals while resulting in 
higher premiums for younger/healthier individuals.  States with either guaranteed issue or 
community rating rules tend to have higher than average premiums because younger and 
healthier people are incentivized to avoid purchasing insurance until they become ill, allowing 
the insurance pools to be disproportionately represented by higher cost individuals.  Supporters 
of these reforms contend that this subsidy is necessary to ensure accessible coverage to all 
regardless of health or age.    
 
In most states, premiums for individual coverage are allowed to vary by age, which can 
encourage younger people to purchase coverage, as well as by gender.  Likewise, most states 
allow insurers to medically underwrite new applications for coverage, which involves a process 
to assess risks and classify them according to degrees of insurability so that appropriate rates 
may be assigned to discernable categories of risk.  Underwriting can discourage individuals from 
waiting until they are ill to purchase insurance, thereby assuring the pool of insured individuals 
within each discernable category has a mix of those who are more healthy and less healthy, 
which serves to spread the risk of claims across the entire population, and assure more level 
premiums.   
 
2. Mandated benefits and access 
 
There are very few federal mandates on health policies in the individual market.34  States, 
however, have enacted a wide variety of laws mandating which categories of individuals must be 
covered by an insurer, which benefits must be covered, and which practitioners must be allowed 
to deliver medical treatment and services.  The Council for Affordable Health Insurance (CAHI) 
issued a report in 2008 listing over 1900 state mandates applicable to individual and small group 
policies.35   These mandates can include: (1) provider mandates such as inclusion of 
chiropractors and acupuncturists; (2) benefit mandates such as the inclusion of prescription 
drugs, well-child care, infertility services, and hearing aids; and (3) covered classes of insureds, 
such as dependent students and grandchildren.   
 
Many forces drive the push to introduce and enact mandates, including guaranteed third-party 
reimbursement for providers and additional coverage for individuals with a particular disease or 
condition.36  Estimates of costs imposed by such mandates vary greatly.  CAHI has developed 
estimate ranges for each of the state mandates, ranging from less than 1% to between 5-10% of 
additional cost.  While the costs of a specific mandate may be low, the accumulation of 40 or 50 
mandates in a state may price certain individuals out of the market.  Critics of mandates note that 
mandates ultimately harm consumer health by imposing static clinical procedures, despite the 
dynamic nature of changing clinical “best practices,” and by raising the cost of health insurance 
and thus contributing to the number of uninsured Americans.37 
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A growing number of states, recognizing that mandates are not cost-free, are requiring 
systematic review of either state mandates or of proposed mandate legislation.  The 
Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy, for example, estimated the total 
spending on the state’s 26 mandated benefits at $1.32 billion, or 12% of premiums for the one-
year study period (July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005).  The true net cost impact of mandated 
benefits, however, was estimated to be significantly lower (in the range of 3-4% of premiums) 
because of federal mandate laws and the likely behavior of insurers and employers in the absence 
of state mandates.38 
 
3. Regulatory regimes for insurers  
 
States also vary in terms of the regulatory regimes they choose to impose on insurers in the 
individual market.  One area in which there is significant variation is in the area of external 
review – also known as independent medical review.  External review laws provide a mechanism 
for resolving health care coverage disputes between consumers and their health insurance plans 
by providing a formal process that allows an appeal of coverage determinations to a third party.  
Currently, 44 states and the District of Columbia have external review programs that apply to 
private health insurance plans, usually in both the group39 and individual markets.40  
 
From an administrative standpoint, however, the scope of these state external review laws differs 
widely.  Some apply to medical necessity determinations41, while others, for example, have 
external review laws that are broader and cover determinations involving experimental services 
or treatments, or even payment denials for providers.42  Other states, such as Arizona and 
Washington, apply external review to any adverse determination affecting coverage.43  Process 
requirements also vary widely in terms of time frames, the nature of the review, the 
qualifications of the reviewer(s), and whether an adverse decision is binding on the insurer. 
 
II. Leading Federal PASL Proposals 
 
PASL proposals attempt to solve the administrative complexities and inefficiencies that can arise 
in state-by-state regulation and help correct what proponents see as resulting distortions in 
pricing which may discourage younger and healthier consumers from purchasing individual 
insurance.  The leading federal PASL proposal is the Choice Act, introduced by Representative 
Shadegg in the last two Congresses.44  Companion bills were introduced by Senator Jim DeMint 
(R-SC) in the Senate.45  
 
In brief, the various versions of the Choice Act would amend the federal Public Health Service 
Act to provide that the laws of the state designated by a health insurance issuer (the “primary” 
state) would apply to individual insurance coverage offered by that issuer in the primary state 
and in any other state (“secondary” state), so long as the coverage and the issuer comply with the 
provisions of the Act.  The Act’s provisions would specify which types of state laws apply, thus 
requiring that the primary state’s law would apply to mandated benefit laws, rating laws 
(including community rating, for example), guaranteed issue, and guaranteed renewal laws.  To 
avoid duplication, the Act would give sole jurisdiction to the primary state to enforce its covered 
laws in the primary state as well as in any secondary state. 
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The secondary state, however, would retain authority in certain specific areas: (a) levying 
nondiscriminatory premium and other taxes, (b) requiring compliance with lawful orders in 
relation to delinquency proceedings in the case of financial impairment, (c) requiring compliance 
with injunctions issued by the secondary state’s courts based on a petition that the issuer is in a 
hazardous financial condition, (d) allowing financial examinations according to NAIC standards 
if the primary state’s insurance commissioner had not done so, (e) requiring non-discriminatory 
participation in an insurance insolvency guaranty association, (f) requiring adherence to the 
secondary state’s law relating to fraud and abuse and unfair claims settlement practices, and (g) 
enforcing countersignature requirements by secondary state agents or brokers.  
 
The Choice Act also requires that there be a process in place for external review in both the 
secondary state and the primary state.  If both states do not have relevant underlying laws or 
regulations, then the issuer must provide an independent review mechanism substantially 
identical to that of the NAIC’s Health Carrier External Review Model Act for all individuals 
who purchase insurance coverage under the Choice Act, except that the reviewer or panel of 
reviewers must meet requirements set out in the Act.46  
 
Senator McCain’s campaign proposal for the private market emphasized individual choice in the 
purchase of health insurance coverage.  Although the plan lacks detail, this author assumes it 
would have had substantial similarities to the Choice Act.  The McCain proposal sought to 
harness competition to improve the quality of health insurance with greater variety to match 
people's needs, lower prices, and portability and allow families to be able to purchase health 
insurance nationwide, across state lines.  Individuals who are not able to purchase insurance in 
this new regulatory environment or who face much higher premiums would be able (under 
Senator McCain’s proposal) to obtain coverage through a guaranteed access plan with a 
limitation on premiums and subsidies for individuals with lower incomes.47  
 
We should note that many non-federal approaches to the same issue of incenting individual 
choice of insurance product have been considered by state legislators.48  Rhode Island, for 
example, enacted a study bill this term that requires the Commissioner of Insurance to review the 
laws and regulations of the state and its New England neighbors to: identify the changes 
necessary to enable insurers licensed in other states to do business in Rhode Island without a 
separate specific license; analyze the advantages and disadvantages of creating a regional health 
insurance marketplace; examine  the extent to which obtaining a license is a barrier for new 
insurers to enter the market; and develop a proposed plan to implement a regional health 
insurance marketplace.49  Interstate Compacts may also provide a similar innovative approach, 
by which states band together either in particular regions (such as Northeast, South, Midwest, 
and West) or nationally.  One example of this approach in another insurance context is the 
Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission.  Thirty-three states have adopted compact 
legislation to establish the Commission which develops uniform national product standards and 
serves as a central point of electronic filing for certain insurance products, including life 
insurance, annuities, long-term care, and disability insurance.50 
 
III. Constitutional Issues 
 
For purposes of this discussion, the proposals that would alter the law to allow individual health 
insurance policies to be sold across state lines all effectively preserve the states’ primary 
authority for the regulation of health insurance while allowing Congress to set standards that 
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modify that authority.  Those federal standards would have a formidable impact, as noted above, 
on almost every aspect of state-regulated insurance markets, including mandates, guaranteed 
issue laws, and community rating requirements.  
 
As Congress sifts alternatives and attempts to craft health insurance reform, any PASL proposals 
(such as the Choice Act and Senator McCain’s) present two overriding constitutional issues:  
 
 Whether the federal government has the authority to regulate insurance so as to limit the 
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
 
 Whether legislation allowing purchase of insurance across state lines could result in 
impermissible commandeering of state regulatory and enforcement bodies in violation of 
the constitutional prohibitions against commandeering. 
 
This paper discusses each of these two issues in turn, as well as suggests possible solutions for 
minimizing constitutional challenges. 
 
A.  Issue #1: Whether the federal government has the authority to regulate insurance so as 
to limit the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
 
As noted above, the McCarran-Ferguson Act reaffirmed the power of the states to regulate and 
tax insurers but allows federal law to trump state enactments if the law “specifically relates to the 
business of insurance”:   
 
“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any 
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, 
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically 
relates to the business of insurance.”51  (emphasis added) 
 
Some have questioned whether Congress can curtail the states’ ability to regulate in their 
respective individual insurance markets by enacting a PASL proposal.  This author notes that a 
review of the legislative history of HIPAA, which introduced significant federal regulation in 
areas previously regulated solely by the states, reveals that the Congressional drafters did not feel 
the need to amend McCarran-Ferguson before imposing federal rules on the individual market. 
 
1. Supreme Court Test 
 
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson sets out distinct guidelines for assessing whether 
a federal statute overrides McCarran-Ferguson’s anti-preemption rule.52  In Barnett, the Supreme 
Court evaluated whether a 1916 federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in small 
towns preempted a 1974 Florida statute prohibiting such banks from selling most types of 
insurance.   
 
In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court engaged in a two-stage 
analysis to determine whether the federal statute preempted the state statute.  First, it looked to 
see whether under ordinary legal principles of preemption, the federal statute would preempt the 
state statute.  Finding no “express preemption”53 and no “field preemption”54, the Court 
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discussed whether federal and state statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict” based on the language 
and purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act taken together.   
 
It found that the federal and state statutes were not in irreconcilable conflict – as they would be if 
the federal statute said “you must sell insurance” and the state statute said “you may not sell 
insurance.”  Rather, a federal statute authorized national banks to engage in activities that the 
state statute expressly forbade.  Florida maintained that the federal statute was intended to allow 
the bank to sell insurance “only to the extent that state law also grants permission to do so.”  
Rejecting that approach, the Court noted that “where Congress has not expressly conditioned the 
grant of ‘power’ upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no such 
condition applies,”   and concluded that under ordinary principles of preemption, the federal law 
preempts the state’s prohibitory statute.  
 
The Court went onto to evaluate whether the McCarran-Ferguson special anti-preemption rule 
governed, and formulated a three part test to examine whether a federal statute “specifically 
relates to the business of insurance.”  First, it examined whether the law “relates” to the business 
of insurance, based on its historically broad interpretation of the term “relates” (giving as an 
example the “relates” to language in the ERISA preemption clause as analyzed in Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux55) and concluded that “[i]n ordinary English, a statute that says that banks may 
act as insurance agents, and that the Comptroller of the Currency may regulate their insurance-
related activities, ‘relates’ to the insurance business.”56 
 
Second, the Court looked at the more “important” issue of whether the statute “specifically” 
relates to the insurance business.  In a plain language analysis, the Court distinguished between 
“implicit” and “explicit” references and contrasted the general term “business activity” with an 
explicit reference to “finance, banking, and insurance.”  
 
The third element of its analysis concerned whether the statute specifically relates to the 
“business of insurance,” with the Court noting that the statute not only focused on industry-
specific selling practices, but also “affects the relation of insured to insurer and the spreading of 
risk – matters that this Court in other contexts, has placed at the core of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act’s concern.”  (preceding cites omitted).  
 
In sum, the court in Barnett confirmed that there is no need for there to be express statutory 
language in a federal statute to allow it to trump state law “regulating the business of insurance” 
additionally noted that this analysis does not require specific language such as “state law is 
preempted” or the like to fall within the McCarran-Ferguson Act exception.   
 
2.  Solutions for Minimizing McCarran-Ferguson Challenges 
 
In the event that PASL proposal or a variation is considered by Congress, its sponsors could 
minimize concerns about a challenge to the federal government’s authority to enact such a 
proposal by taking the following two steps:  
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a)  State clearly that the Congress intends to regulate interstate commerce through the 
legislation.  The drafters should clearly invoke interstate commerce jurisdiction, as courts 
traditionally have been very deferential to the Congress when evaluating whether the 
federal government has interstate commerce jurisdiction.  
 
The very reason for the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was the Supreme Court’s 
expansive holding, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., that “[n]o commercial 
enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly 
beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.  We cannot make an 
exception of the business of insurance.”57   
 
While the specific lines of the Commerce Clause have shifted over the years, there appears little 
doubt of Congress’s power to regulate insurance, even if certain insurance activities were viewed 
as solely intrastate.58  Any judicial review of a statute would be subject to only “rational basis” 
analysis.59    
 
The Health Care Choice Act of 2007 included a specification of constitutional authority under 
the Commerce Clause: “This Act is enacted pursuant to the power granted Congress under article 
I, section 8, clause 3, of the United States Constitution.”  Additionally, the Act included a 
findings section delineating the case for interstate commerce jurisdiction in order to set forth a 
basis for finding a “rational” basis for the linkage.60  The proposed legislation provided a 
“roadmap” finding section, noting that (a) state law variations impact the ability of insurers to 
offer and individuals to obtain affordable individual health coverage, thus impeding interstate 
commerce; (b) the channels for offering coverage (Internet and mail) are part of interstate 
commerce; (c) the appropriateness of  increasing efficiency through a collaborative approach of 
states; and (d) risk-retention groups as a successful model for sale of insurance across state lines. 
This level of specification in federal legislation should prove sufficient to satisfy court scrutiny. 
 
b)  Ensuring that the legislation meets the standards of ordinary legal preemption in one of 
three ways: (1) express preemption (stating that the law expressly preempts state laws on 
the subject); (2) regulating the area so pervasively, that the law achieves “field 
preemption;” or (3) establishing the type of conflict between federal and state laws so as to 
establish a basis for “conflict preemption.” 
 
In the case of a PASL proposal, the drafters can achieve the intended result through either 
express preemption language or following the blueprint laid out by the court in Barnett Bank.  
Any language should thus ensure that the legislation clearly (1) specifically; (2) relates; (3) to the 
business of insurance.  It does not appear that this test would be problematic for the Health Care 
Choice Act of 2007 or the very similar McCain proposal.  So long as the proposal explicitly 
relates to “finance, banking, and insurance,” it will almost certainly satisfy the test.  The Health 
Care Choice Act of 2007 recognizes this and provides such specificity, for example, in the 
findings section reproduced above.  Likewise, the McCain proposal has an explicit statement: 
“An important part of [the] plan is to use competition to improve the quality of health insurance 
with greater variety to match people's needs, lower prices, and portability.  Families should be 
able to purchase health insurance nationwide, across state lines.”61  
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Second, because the term “relates to” is interpreted so broadly by the Court, any common-sense 
link to insurance in the legislation will likely be satisfactory.  Finally, the “business of insurance” 
prong of the test is likely to be satisfied on its face by the current wording of either the Health 
Care Choice Act of 2007 or a proposal by Senator McCain. 
 
B.  Issue #2: Whether a purchase of insurance across state lines proposal would result in 
impermissible commandeering of state regulatory and enforcement bodies in violation of 
constitutional prohibitions against commandeering. 
 
A second legal issue with PASL proposals such as the Choice Act is whether they improperly 
require state insurance departments to enforce new federal standards.  Some have argued that 
state legislatures would specifically need to adopt these federal standards62 to make them 
enforceable under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, since the Supreme Court has held 
that “Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.”63 
 
The Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering language provides: “The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”64  That language raises the following questions:  
 
 Although PASL proposals “at first glance” appear to retain regulatory authority and 
responsibility with the primary state’s insurance commissioner and not compel new 
functions, would the primary state’s insurance commissioner be considered to be 
“commandeered” because the commissioner would now have the added duty of enforcing 
standards for state licensed insurers issuing policies to insureds residing in other states?65 
 
 Would a secondary state’s insurance commissioner be considered to be “commandeered” 
by virtue of being required to monitor the financial conditions of out-of-state insurers 
selling insurance to the secondary state’s residents?66 
 
 Would recordkeeping imposed by such proposals – such as requiring the completion of 
federal forms certifying compliance with state law – be interpreted by a court as 
commandeering?67 
 
1. Supreme Court’s Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
 
The leading case on “commandeering” is Printz v. United States.68  There, chief law enforcement 
officers for counties in Montana and Arizona challenged the constitutionality of interim 
provisions of the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that directed state law 
enforcement officers to participate in the administration of a federally-enacted regulatory 
scheme.  The legislation required the chief law enforcement officer of each local jurisdiction to 
conduct background checks of handgun purchasers until such time as a national system was in 
place.   
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned that requirement in a 5-4 decision with an opinion 
delivered by Justice Scalia: 
 
We held in New York69 that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce 
a federal regulatory program.  Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent 
that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly.  The Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular 
problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.  It matters not 
whether policymaking is involved, and no case by case weighing of the burdens 
or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.70 
 
The door does not seem to be shut, on the other hand, for a reading that “voluntary compliance” 
by states or use of the spending power to urge state participation may pass muster.  Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence supports that view, especially coupled with the four dissenters' analysis 
that the Brady Act provisions were constitutional: 
 
Our holding, of course, does not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act.  
States and chief law enforcement officers may voluntarily continue to participate 
in the federal program.  Moreover, the directives to the States are merely interim 
provisions scheduled to terminate November 30, 1998.  Congress is also free to 
amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis 
with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs.71  
(citations omitted)  
 
Another Supreme Court case may shed some additional light on how courts could evaluate a 
PASL proposal, if elements of a bill were deemed to regulate state activities as opposed to the 
actions of private parties.  In Reno v. Condon, South Carolina and its attorney general challenged 
the constitutionality of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), which limits the 
ability of states to release a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent.72  The 
Supreme Court held that the Act was a proper exercise of the authority of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.  Additionally, the Court distinguished Printz 
because the DPPA did not require state officials to enforce federal law in violation of the Tenth 
Amendment, but instead regulated the state as an owner of a database rather than attempting to 
control or influence the manner in which states regulated private parties.   
 
2. Strategies for Minimizing Anti-Commandeering Challenges 
 
In the event that a PASL bill is considered by Congress, its sponsors could minimize concerns 
about an anti-commandeering challenge to the Federal government’s authority to enact this 
proposal by taking the following steps:  
 
a) Make the best case possible that any responsibilities modified as the result of the 
legislation do not impose “new” duties on state officials.  The drafters could characterize 
the choice of law rule as an exercise of federal preemption power under the Supremacy 
Clause.  Drafters could be mindful of characterizing the duties of primary and secondary 
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state officials as consistent with already-existing duties of the official.  Any additional 
actions could thus be characterized as not constituting direct compulsion of the state 
officials.73  Another approach might be to characterize the participation of states as “primary 
states” in the program as a voluntary effort.74  
 
b) Provide new funding to the states from the federal government to establish spending 
power authority to incentivize states to participate in the program.  One option to 
consider would be to provide the states with federal dollars or incentives to participate in the 
program.  Congress’ spending power is broad, but not unlimited.  It is subject to the 
following restrictions: (1) the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of "the 
general welfare;" (2) if Congress desires to condition the states' receipt of federal funds, it 
must do so unambiguously so that the states can exercise their choice knowingly; (3) there 
must be a relationship "to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs"; and 
(4) no other  constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional 
grant of federal funds.75   
 
Conclusion 
 
The various proposals to allow individuals to purchase and insurers to sell insurance across state 
lines are motivated by the laudatory goals of making health insurance more affordable by 
increasing competition among health insurers, giving consumers more choices of products and 
companies, and minimizing costs of duplicative or unnecessary regulation by 51 different 
regulators with varying rules.  The constitutional difficulties appear to be surmountable if 
legislation is drafted properly.  But the practical difficulties of such an approach are legion. 
 
Fundamentally, by overturning the traditional paradigm of solely state-regulated insurance 
products, PASL proposals of all stripes create difficulties in determining what was heretofore a 
simple question:  “Where does the policy live?”  The shift will necessarily impact all kinds of 
state assessments on insurers.  For example, over 30 states have implemented high-risk health 
pools, which are nonprofit organizations created by state law to offer health insurance to 
individuals who otherwise would be unable to secure coverage.  Because the premiums collected 
from participants in these pools fund only about 58% of costs, however, the vast majority assess 
health insurers for at least a portion of the pools’ funding, with formulas based on revenue 
generated in the state or on market share in the state.76  Yet those funding mechanisms may be 
difficult to sustain in a state where consumers choose to “vote with their feet” and purchase 
policies issued in another state.  
 
There are additional practical problems about how PASL proposals would impact the myriad 
areas of extensive state-based regulation of not only insurers but also others working with them 
in the chain, such as state rules relating to licensing of brokers and/or agents, prompt pay 
requirements for providers, and provider adequacy and network requirements.  Thus, how can 
Maryland require a Colorado-based insurer to comply with Maryland network adequacy rules?  
Should state prompt-pay requirements be enforced based on the residence of the consumer or 
based on where the provider service is rendered?  Any federal PASL proposal would need to 
contemplate how to address these difficult issues, and many papers have been published arguing 
the pros and cons of allowing consumers to buy insurance from outside their domicile state, and 
proposing variations on PASL proposals.77 
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This paper has outlined a variety of other legal and practical issues that arise from a federal 
PASL proposal, many of which have been raised and vigorously discussed by consumer 
advocates, insurance commissioners, and academics.  Perhaps the overriding issue is how PASL 
proposals –which impact only the individual market – would fit within what seems to be a 
broader national effort to reform the health care system in terms of both access and affordability.  
PASL proposals in essence attempt to simplify only one element of the health insurance 
regulation, by eliminating comprehensive (and often duplicative and variable) state-by-state 
regulation, while leaving in its place arguably less comprehensive regulation that may also be 
less protective of individuals from the “primary state.”  As the CBO has noted, these proposals 
may drive healthy individuals currently insured by employer-based coverage to opt for 
individual, less expensive coverage purchased from another state, leaving sicker and more 
expensive workers in the group coverage.78  Broader efforts at reform that address all markets – 
individual, group, and government-regulated – may be the better approach to reform.   
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